I have attempted to find “independent published verification” of Ottawa’s 10,000
phd claim for roughly 18 years. No luck. All published references to this figure in the transportation literature state OC Transpo as the source – or the former general manager who spearheaded BRT development (John Bonsall) – or give no source at all.

Nor does any published reference state – except in very general terms (e.g. “Southeast Transitway”) – when and where this volume might be observed.

Therefore: If there is a location along the Ottawa transitway system where one might stand (or sit) and observe the passage of 10,000 passengers during a continuous 60-minute interval, then that location is a closely guarded secret (together with other key details, such as season of year and time of day).

2.) OC Transpo claimed for years that BRT provided large capital and operating cost savings.

The theory, outlined in its alternatives analysis, went like this: “BRT” would permit higher operating speeds than buses in mixed traffic. Each bus would therefore be able to cover more km during peak periods. In other words, a given level of peak-period service could be operated with fewer buses. That would permit a smaller number of vehicles in peak-period service, and a smaller overall fleet size. Result: savings in capital cost (smaller fleet, less investment for storage and service facilities) and operating cost (fewer buses, and drivers, required for peak-period service).

In other words, OC Transpo asserted that it would obtain – and was obtaining – greater productivity as the result of BRT.

Which was not true, and could be demonstrated as such using statistics published by OC Transpo. It said, in effect, that two key performance indicators would
change – significantly – in the direction of “greater productivity.”

–Increased “annual bus km per platform hour” and

–increased “annual bus km per scheduled peak bus.”

Almost too good to be true, eh ?

What actually took place, as successive Transitway segments were brought into service, was – nothing. The two “performance indicators” described above did not budge. These results were apparent, from the annual statistical compilations, almost from “day 1.”

From 1982 to 2002, OC Transpo “operating cost per revenue service hour” rose by nearly 60 percent – adjusting for inflation, and during a period when “real” wage rates paid by OC Transpo remained stable.

Not only that: maintenance costs, fuel consumption, non-revenue (“deadhead”) km and
road calls all increased while labor utilization became less efficient. Management did moderate the negative trends in cost-effectiveness by improving service effectiveness.

However, the “cost” of the “inherent” or “structural” inefficiencies associated
with Ottawa’s transitway program – which have not been explained – is considerable. Based on 2002 service levels, the implied annual cost (CAD 2002) was about 65 million; the implied cumulative cost from 1982 to 2002 is roughly (CAD 2002) 1.4 billion.

BRT, Ottawa-style, is perhaps not the best of ideas.

“I’m convinced that BRT is an attempt to convince us that we can do without rail.”

Mode choice is an is a planning / design / engineering / financial issue that cannot be critiqued solely from the perspective of social science (… or ideology …).

In general, if ridership works out to a weekday average of 5,000 passenger-km per km of line length, then a low-cost rail line can be justified and will provide lower operating costs than buses.

Other factors need to be taken into account (peak-period passengers per hours), but this “meter-stick” is quite familiar overseas (especially in Japan).

If ridership works out to a weekday average of 10,000 passenger-km per km of line length, then significant investment for strategic grade separation, perhaps even a downtown subway, is justified. “Required” is sometimes a better term.

If ridership works out to a weekday average of 20,000 passenger-km per km of line length, then full separation can be justified – and will provide significantly higher service quality and lower operating cost than buses in mixed traffic.

Of course, if a city does not have the capital (or the inclination) to build a rail line, bus service can certainly be improved. This should be “routine policy” in all major cities, because not all lines have sufficient traffic to justify the investment for rail development.

The Ottawa BRT (“Transitway”) system is a classic example of something that other cities should not try – unless they wish to risk the less-than-favorable operating-cost trends that are well documented by published statistics.

The Ottawa transit system publishes the best compilation of transit operating statistics that I’ve yet seen. These document some strongly negative trends that coincide with Transitway expansion. However, it seems that most everyone in town – even transit advocates who are strongly critical of BRT – avert their eyes.

BRT is not as pemanent as rail. I know it could work in the short term, but in the long term, busways make less sense. This short term thought process is what’s being used to favour BRT and make it look better than LRT. They just like BRT on Geary more because it’s cheaper, and according to them, in my opinion, cheaper is better. Cheaper is not necessarily better. I would not want to treat transit investment as being like an investment in the stock market, which is what they seem to do.

Are you familiar with the geography of the area?

I suppose every situation has its own unique combination of engineering and political issues, but what I read suggested that things would be designed to enable an upgrade to light rail when/where possible. It could be a wise move indeed to get a wedge in and then go from there rather than to be so unrealistic that nothing happens. There is no reason to think either that a BRT line is permanent or that it somehow undermines rail. I wish rail proponents were more open to acknowledging the potential benefits of BRT. That said, I have never lived in a place with BRT. So …

BRT is a swindle in general to me. After 11 years of living here (I moved from Newfoundland), I’m convinced that BRT is an attempt to convince us that we can do without rail. Bad.

If we replaced this with LRT, you would be stuck with only two surface tracks that travel no faster than traffic, which is very slow in SF due to commute congestion, as well as suffering long boarding/deboarding times due to the high numbers of riders. There would be no way for any LRT vehicle to pass another, so everyone would be forced to take a painfully slow ride to/from downtown.

Additionally we already have multiple articulated (i.e. double-capacity) buses that back up 2 or 3 at a time along Geary and that still is sometimes not enough capacity to handle ridership (estimated at 45,000 daily I believe). What would be the point of having LRT after LRT backed up along rail on this corridor? I really don’t see how this would be an improvement – instead it would be a massive fiinancial expenditure that would please train types but would potentially degrade service levels. If we are willing to judge transit modes based on their pros and cons and not pre-conceived biases, BRT has more going for it than just a low implementation cost and surface-running LRT is inappropriate for this corridor.

SF residents ride buses despite their drawbacks. Turning the Geary line into Muni Metro would not solve anything in my opinion. BART along Geary as a complementary service would be very fantastic, but I’m not holding my breath.

Also, Yonah, as far as bike or ped improvements to the corridor, I see nothing about this in the SFMTC report. Geary is a terrible street to walk or bike along but I don’t see that changing unless even more auto lanes are removed and we all know that’s not going to happen. There will be no bike lane or multi-use path. Sidewalks will continue to be inadequate for the high numbers of pedstrians. The SFMTC clearly did not even consider those issues in their analysis, or if they did, they gave up and omitted them from the report.

I hope this works out ultimately. These studies have been taking forever and I don’t see anything going into service until 2015 or 2016 based on the current pace and the MTC’s track record for implementing projects. Likewise the omission of improvements east of Gough is criminal in my opinion, but I’m hopeful that this will result in an improvement to transit along this corridor and the chances of Geary BRT being a boondoggle are much lower than, say, the Chinatown subway, which I think is a disaster already 10 years in the making.

I consider it irresponsible to further the stigmatization of buses.